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contractors and grantees. 
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conferences, symposia, seminars, or other 
meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by NASA. 
 SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from NASA 
programs, projects, and missions, often 
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public interest. 
 TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientific and 
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission. 
     Specialized services also include creating custom 
thesauri, building customized databases, and 
organizing and publishing research results. 
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program, see the following: 
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Abstract 
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), initially formed in 
2003, is an independently funded NASA Program whose dedicated team 
of technical experts provides objective engineering and safety 
assessments of critical, high risk projects. NESC’s strength is rooted in 
the diverse perspectives and broad knowledge base that add value to its 
products, affording customers a responsive, alternate path for assessing 
and preventing technical problems while protecting vital human and 
national resources. The Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) 
Technical Discipline Team (TDT) is one of fifteen such discipline-
focused teams within the NESC organization. The TDT membership is 
composed of GN&C specialists from across NASA and its partner 
organizations in other government agencies, industry, national 
laboratories, and universities. This paper will briefly define the vision, 
mission, and purpose of the NESC organization. The role of the GN&C 
TDT will then be described in detail along with an overview of how this 
team operates and engages in its objective engineering and safety 
assessments of critical NASA projects. This paper will then describe 
selected recent experiences, over the period 2007 to present, of the 
GN&C TDT in which they directly performed or supported a wide 
variety of NESC assessments and consultations.  
1.0 Introduction 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Engineering Safety Center 
(NESC), initially formed in 2003 in the wake of the Columbia tragedy, is an example of a One-
NASA Program. NESC is an independently funded NASA program whose dedicated team of 
technical experts coordinates and conducts objective engineering and safety assessments of 
critical, high-risk projects. The NESC is a strong technical resource for customers and 
stakeholders seeking responsive service for solving the Agency’s difficult problems. NESC’s 
strength is rooted in the diverse perspectives and broad knowledge base that add value to its 
products, affording customers a responsive, alternate path for assessing and preventing technical 
problems while protecting vital human and national resources. NESC provides timely technical 
positions to its customers and stakeholders based on independent test and analysis, not opinion.  
By encouraging alternative viewpoints and ensuring objective reporting methods, NESC is able 
to serve as a uniquely unbiased assessment resource. NESC delivers technical evaluation and 
consultation products in the form of written reports that include solution-driven, preventative, 
and corrective recommendations. In July of 2011, the NESC initiated its 370th technical 
assessment. The NESC communicates its lessons learned from each assessment to NASA’s 
leadership through bi-annual briefings and to engineers through both the Agency Lesson Learned 
system and a series of NESC Technical Bulletins issued periodically. These communication 
channels function to inform the NASA technical community and, therefore, NESC’s customers 
and stakeholders. NESC’s range of services includes testing, analysis, and data review in fifteen 
engineering disciplines. NESC also engages in proactive discipline advancing activities. 
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The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Technical Discipline Team (TDT), the primary 
subject of this paper, is one of fifteen (15) such discipline-focused teams within the NESC 
organization. The NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C maintains and leads the TDT. The TDT 
membership is composed of senior GN&C engineers from across NASA’s Field Centers as well 
as from its partner organizations in other government Agencies, industry, national laboratories, 
and universities. 
This paper will briefly define the vision, mission, and purpose of the NESC organization. It 
contains a detailed description of the role of the GN&C TDT and an overview of how this team 
operates and engages in its objective engineering and safety assessments of critical NASA 
projects. Descriptions of several recent, 2007 to present, experiences in which the GN&C TDT 
performed or supported a wide variety of NESC assessments and consultations are also included 
in this paper.  
2.0 NESC Vision, Mission, and Organization 
One of the tenets of an effective safety philosophy is to provide an avenue for independent 
assessment of the technical aspects and risks of critical systems. NESC offers this alternate 
reporting path for all NASA programs and projects.  
The vision that NESC has for itself is to serve as the independent and objective deep technical 
resource of choice for NASA Programs and other government Agencies. As its fundamental 
mission, the NESC strives to set the example for engineering and technical excellence within 
NASA. The primary purpose of this independent and objective organization is to increase safety 
through engineering excellence. NESC collaborates with its customers and stakeholders to 
ensure the safety and success of their programs and projects. A resource for the Agency, the 
NESC is a unique and valuable asset for the high-risk programs that NASA undertakes.  
At the core of the NESC is an established knowledge base of technical specialists pulled from the 
ten NASA Centers and from a group of partner organizations external to the Agency. This ready 
group of engineering experts is organized into 15 TDTs. TDT members are drawn from NASA, 
industry, academia, and other government Agencies. By drawing on the minds of leading 
engineers from across the country, the NESC consistently solves technical problems, deepens its 
knowledge base, strengthens its technical capabilities, and broadens its perspectives, thereby 
further executing its commitment to engineering excellence. 
Maintaining a diverse and broad base of knowledge, keeping informed and engaged with each 
Center and the Agency’s major programs, responding efficiently to requests for assistance, and 
retaining a high degree of independence are the basis of the organizational structure of the 
NESC. There are some 50+ full-time NESC-badged employees, the majority of which are based 
at NESC Headquarters located at NASA’s Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia. 
NESC employs over 550 other engineers nationwide (part-time) as the members of the 15 TDTs.  
To achieve the goals stated above, the NESC is organized into six distinct offices: 
NASA Technical Fellows assemble, maintain and provide leadership for the TDTs and are 
stewards for their disciplines. The Technical Fellows serve as the senior technical experts for the 
Agency in support of the Office of the Chief Engineer and the NESC. They are an independent 
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resource to the Agency and industry to resolve complex issues in their respective discipline 
areas. While they all lead their own NESC TDTs, some Technical Fellows may also lead 
Agency-wide discipline Working Groups. Specifically, the Technical Fellows are responsible 
for:  1) fostering consistency of Agency-level standards and specifications, 2) promoting 
discipline stewardship through workshops, conferences and discipline advancing activities, and 
3) ensuring identification and incorporation of lessons learned  into Agency processes. 
NESC Chief Engineers provide insight into their Centers’ programs and help to coordinate the 
facilities and resources of each Center when required to support NESC activities. NESC also 
proactively exploits its network of Center-based Chief Engineers for outreach to and 
communications with the broad NASA community. The Chief Engineers also coordinate with 
the NASA Technical Fellows in the process of identifying potential discipline issues and 
problems to be addressed proactively by the NESC.  
Principal Engineers use TDT members provided by the NASA Technical Fellows and resources 
arranged by the NESC Chief Engineers to lead independent technical reviews, assessments, tests, 
and analyses. 
The Systems Engineering Office dispositions requests as they come in, performs proactive 
trending analysis and problem identification, and provides other integration and system 
engineering support. 
The Management and Technical Support Office is the business arm of the NESC, taking care 
of the contracting, budgeting, and management of the NESC’s infrastructure. 
Under the leadership of the Director’s Office, these five components come together to form the 
heart of the NESC — the NESC Review Board (NRB). The life cycle, from initial assessment 
plans to interim status briefings to final reports, of every formal activity performed by the NESC 
requires approval of the NRB. The NRB is a vital peer review process for the NESC, which 
directly supports the development of high quality end products for stakeholders. All NESC 
reports must be reviewed and approved by the NRB prior to out-briefing the stakeholders. The 
NRB brings a diversity of thought to the decision-making process. It is an amalgam of people 
representing different Centers, programs, and engineering backgrounds. 
After an activity performed by the NESC has concluded, results are delivered to the stakeholders 
in the form of written engineering reports that include solution-driven preventative and 
corrective recommendations. The NESC strives to set the example for the Agency by providing 
full and appropriate documentation of every activity. Along with each report, lessons learned are 
communicated to Agency leadership and to engineers through avenues such as the Agency’s 
Lessons Learned system, the reports themselves, and the periodic NESC Technical Bulletins.  
In addition to acting on requests from outside of the NESC, another important function of the 
NESC is to engage in proactive investigations to identify and address potential concerns before 
they become major problems. To further this goal, the NESC is currently leading NASA’s efforts 
for independent data mining and trend analysis. The NESC has established a Data Mining and 
Trending Working Group that includes representatives from all NASA Centers as well as 
external to the Agency. 
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3.0 NESC GN&C TDT 
The GN&C TDT is a technical resource that supports the NESC and the NRB-approved 
independent assessment teams. The primary purpose of the GN&C TDT is to engage in the 
resolution of GN&C related issues throughout the agency when directed by the NRB or by 
NESC senior leadership. A secondary purpose of the GN&C TDT is to identify proactively 
Agency-wide GN&C engineering discipline issues and problems.  
The NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C is assembles, maintains, and manages the CN&C TDT. 
The GN&C resources (subject matter experts, tools, and test facilities) required to support the 
assessment teams and other GN&C-specific NESC activities come from the TDT. The GN&C 
TDT is cognizant of all GN&C related assessments to ensure adequate and timely GN&C 
expertise support. This is accomplished via bi-weekly teleconference meetings and with annual 
face-to-face meetings of the TDT. These and other communication mechanisms (e.g., a NESC-
internal GN&C TDT secure website to post team news and other information) are used to unite 
the TDT members located across NASA.  
The GN&C TDT consists of individuals that are experts in a wide range of GN&C sub-
disciplines including GN&C systems, GN&C analysis, GN&C components and hardware 
systems (sensors, actuators, interfacing hardware systems), GN&C software, flight dynamics, 
mission design, flight operations, launch vehicle flight mechanics analyses, and launch vehicle 
guidance systems. As mentioned above, this team of experts collectively serves as discipline 
“think tank” to identify potential GN&C issues and problems to address proactively by the 
NESC.  
Given the wide-breadth and depth required to staff the GN&C TDT adequately as well as to 
support multiple assessments simultaneously, a staffing model has been developed to recruit and 
staff the GN&C discipline TDT. This staffing model requires skill sets representing discipline 
systems experts, sub-discipline specific experts, and technical team support personnel. The 
GN&C TDT consists of a “core” group of approximately 20–30 discipline systems experts. It 
also consists of an extended team of about 5–6 specific experts from each of the sub-discipline 
areas of expertise that encompass the broad scope of the GN&C discipline at NASA. These sub-
discipline experts are on call-up to the NASA Technical Fellow and to the core team. 
Approximately 100 GN&C experts, the majority of them being NASA Civil Service employees 
from across the Agency, currently comprise the entire NESC GN&C TDT. When the operational 
function of the GN&C discipline TDT is constrained by limited Agency in-house staffing 
resources, additional GN&C discipline expertise from outside the NASA community (e.g., 
industry and academia) are exploited to augment the TDT membership. 
The members of the “core” group are senior level individuals from across the Agency that have 
broad, but expert knowledge. These senior experts have in-depth knowledge of one, or several, 
GN&C expertise areas, but probably not all the GN&C areas of expertise. The individuals who 
make up the TDT’s “core” group possess exemplary leadership and teamwork skills since they 
both represent their Center’s GN&C engineering organization and also serve as the GN&C 
leadership interface to the NESC’s assessment teams.  
The sub-discipline specific experts are individuals that have in-depth experience and expertise in 
a specific GN&C area. The TDT core group defines these specific areas. For example, on the 
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GN&C TDT, there will be sub-discipline experts in the following areas:  inertial sensors, GPS 
navigation, spacecraft attitude determination and control, stellar/celestial sensors, formation 
flying, flight dynamics, aeronautical vehicle flight control, inter-planetary navigation, flight 
mechanics, reaction wheels, control moment gyros, controls structures interaction, mission 
design, launch vehicle guidance and control, etc. 
The technical support group is the third and last major component of the GN&C TDT. The 
technical support group is a small (about 3–5 people) contingent of individuals that support the 
NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C in the day-to-day management and operation of the GN&C 
TDT. These are typically GN&C engineers with perhaps 5–8 years of professional work 
experience. They contribute routine administrative and technical support (e.g., recording 
teleconference meeting minutes, providing logistics for the annual face-to-face meeting, updating 
the TDT’s internal website, etc.) while at the same time benefiting from the mentoring 
experience of working with the other TDT members. The technical support group, by virtue of 
their role on the TDT, has exposure to a wide range of GN&C problems from across NASA as 
well as the opportunity to witness first-hand the problem solving skills of some the Agency’s 
senior GN&C engineers. This has turned out to be a win-win situation that both benefit the 
operation of the TDT and the technical support group personnel.  
In closing this section of the paper there are some general observations that should made 
regarding the multiple benefits of serving as a TDT member. Working as a member of an NESC 
TDT clearly offers challenging opportunities. Members of the TDT interact with the best of the 
best in NASA, industry, academia, and other government agencies to address a broad spectrum 
of discipline technical issues. TDT members also find that working within the NESC 
organizational structure permits an exposure to other NASA programs, projects, cultures, 
methods, and business practices from across the Agency. Typically, this allows experiences to be 
gained outside one’s normal work area within a single NASA Center organization. The 
experience should broaden one’s horizons via the wide network of job-related interactions. There 
will be technically challenging and diverse assignments of a high impact/high feedback/high 
visibility nature. Serving on a TDT provides an avenue for both professional growth and positive 
recognition, not only within the discipline Community of Practice but also within the NESC’s 
customer and stakeholder community. The overall TDT experience is one that should provide 
motivated, tenacious, and intellectually curious team members with a very high degree of job 
satisfaction. 
4.0 Experiences of the NESC GN&C TDT 
The GN&C TDT has engaged in multiple NESC assessments, consultations and reviews since 
the NESC became an operational organization in November of 2003. Reference 1 provides a 
description of NESC GN&C TDT activities over the period 2003 to 2007.  
Highlighted in this section are several of the most recent TDT experiences. In certain cases, 
significant relevant technical details are provided as background. These experiences, which 
occurred over the period from 2007 to present, were selected to illustrate the wide variety of 
work the GN&C TDT engages in. The reader will see that the GN&C TDT supported both 
human space flight projects and robotic spacecraft projects. The time durations over which the 
work was performed varied from durations of a few weeks to a month or two for the smaller 
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scale quick-reaction peer review tasks to durations of several months to over a year for larger 
scale efforts. In cases where the task was primarily focused on a specific GN&C discipline issue, 
the work was performed exclusively by the NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C and/or small 
contingents of GN&C TDT members. In other cases that required a more multi-disciplinary 
approach the GN&C TDT members supported the task as part of a larger, integrated NESC team 
effort under the direction and leadership of an NESC Project Engineer. As with the majority of 
NESC endeavors, experts from virtually all NASA Centers, other government Agencies, national 
laboratories, academia, and industry were involved in conducting these activities.  
4.1 Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Flight Test Assessment 
The NESC designed, developed, and flew the alternative MLAS as risk mitigation for the 
baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort system (LAS) already in development. The NESC was 
tasked with both formulating a conceptual objective system (OS) design of this alternative 
MLAS as well as demonstrating this concept with a simulated pad abort (PA) flight test. The 
goal was to obtain sufficient flight test data to assess performance, validate models/tools, and to 
reduce the design and development risks for a MLAS OS.  
In June 2007, the Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
(ESMD) requested the NESC undertake the MLAS Project. The MLAS was named after 
Maxime (Max) Faget. Dr. Faget was the lead designer of the Mercury space capsule and 
developed its abort system called the “Aerial Capsule Emergency Separation Device”. It was in 
his honor that the MLAS was named. His innovative spirit and his team’s rapid development of 
new technologies formed the inspiration for the MLAS Project.  
The charter for the MLAS Project was to develop, design, and test an alternate concept for the 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) LAS. MLAS would be theoretically capable of 
extracting the Orion vehicle from the launch vehicle at any time from crew ingress at the launch 
pad through staging and ignition of the second or upper stage of the Ares-I crew launch vehicle. 
The MLAS Project would conclude with at least one full-scale unmanned PA test suitable for 
demonstrating the viability of this alternate LAS concept. The MLAS project would be run 
independently from the Constellation Program (CxP) and Orion Project in order to minimize 
impact on in-line program resources. It was dictated that off-the-shelf hardware and existing 
technology would be used wherever possible on MLAS. Design and development work 
previously accomplished by the NESC would be leveraged for this project. Previous work 
includes the CEV smart buyer design (SBD), composite crew module, and the alternate launch 
abort system. This NESC infrastructure was used to form the NASA-wide MLAS Project team. 
For example, members of the GN&C TDT (Reference 1) were recruited to serve on the MLAS 
GN&C team and other members were subsequently recruited to serve as peer reviewers of the 
GN&C team’s work.  
The origins of the tower-less MLAS flight test vehicle (FTV) can be traced to the initial notional 
‘back of the napkin’ drawing (see Figure 1a) that was conceived during a CEV SBD study 
outbrief brainstorming session in March 2006. Subsequently, a refined MLAS drawing (see 
Figure 1b) was provided to NESC in June 2007 by Scott “Doc” Horowitz, the Associate 
Administrator for the ESMD at the time MLAS was initiated, as a notional point of departure for 
the early system level trades and vehicle configuration studies. It is interesting to compare the 
final MLAS FTV prelaunch physical configuration (see Figure 1c) with the original notional 
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drawings depicted in Figure 1a and Figure 1b. One can clearly see that the MLAS concept differs 
from Orion LAS in that it uses side-mounted abort motors instead of a tower-tractor abort motor 
design that pulls the crew module (CM) from above. The tower abort motor has been designed 
out of the MLAS concept and the CM fully encapsulated in a forward fairing. 
 
a) First notional 
conceptual drawing 
(2006). 
b) Refined conceptual drawing 
(2007). 
c) Mounted on launch stool at 
Wallops Island (2009). 
Figure  1.  MLAS FTV. 
The MLAS GN&C team was formed in July 2007 and was given the responsibility for modeling, 
simulating and analyzing the trajectory and attitude dynamics of the MLAS FTV during its 
simulated PA flight. The GN&C team ensured that the flight test occurred within the envelope 
defined by the requirements, and they constructed the nominal target flight timeline and 
trajectory. The GN&C team selected all of the MLAS trajectory and attitude flight 
instrumentation equipment including the inertial measurement units (IMUs) and global 
positioning system (GPS) receivers. The team chose these navigation sensors to generate flight 
test data that would permit post-flight reconstruction of MLAS vehicle trajectory and attitude 
dynamics. Analyses performed by the GN&C team determined ballasting, motor alignment, and 
launch stand angle requirements. Over the course of the MLAS Project the GN&C team worked 
closely with the System Engineering and Integration, Aerodynamics, Landing and Recovery 
System, Propulsion, Avionics, Software, Structures, and Loads and Dynamics teams and also 
with the MLAS Chief Engineer. The MLAS Project was by far the most extensive activity 
undertaken by the GN&C TDT over the period of time being covered in this paper.  
The MLAS simulated PA flight test was successfully conducted from Wallops Island on 8 July 
2009. Figure 2 shows the MLAS FTV shortly after abort motor ignition. Figures 3 and 4 depict 
the CM altitude versus range and the CM altitude versus time, respectively. Figures 3 and 4 show 
the position data from the GPS receivers alongside the pre-flight predictions made with the wind, 
density, static pressure and speed of sound data from the L-3 minute balloon sonde. The as-flown 
flight trajectory was somewhat steeper than that predicted in the pre-flight simulation; however, 
the trajectory deviation from the prediction was within 0.75 standard deviations in all directions.  
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Figure 2.  Launch of MLAS FTV from Wallops Flight Facility (8 July 2009). 
 
Figure 3.  MLAS CM altitude versus range. 
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Figure 4.  CM altitude versus time. 
The GN&C TDT can look back upon the MLAS experience and observe that less than two years 
after project start the flight test of this alternative launch vehicle abort system was conducted in 
very close agreement with its operations concept. All the key flight test events occurred in the 
prescribed sequential order and within acceptable tolerances of the exact pre-planned time and 
flight dynamic conditions. The entire flight test duration was 88 seconds during which multiple 
staging events were performed, and nine separate critically timed parachute deployments 
occurred as scheduled. Overall, the as-flown flight performance was as predicted prior to launch. 
The primary lesson learned on MLAS was the extent to which the design and integration of a 
LAS can impact and influence the overall launch vehicle/spacecraft system design, overall 
reliability, and performance capabilities. Several other important lessons learned from this 
MLAS flight test experience are:   
 The need for all project team members to look beyond their immediate discipline task to 
think, speak up, and act like Systems Engineers for the benefit of the project. 
 The need for planned periodic crosschecks of critical analytical results by having 
technical ‘shoot outs’ between different engineering groups using different tools/methods 
to independently generate analytical products. 
 The need for periodic and informal face-to-face peer reviews; the emphasis should be on 
reviewing the details of modeling assumptions, analytic methods, uncertainty 
assumptions, simulation results, control law algorithm designs, software code, etc., and 
not on preparing formal presentations and responding to action items.  
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 The need for stringent mass properties testing, and vehicle mass properties configuration 
control measures and routine periodic reports, especially on a passively controlled 
vehicle. 
 The degree of difficulty in safely and reliably performing precision alignment of the solid 
rocket abort motors was initially underestimated.  
 The need to manage and limit insidious unchecked vehicle mass growth which erodes 
flight performance, degrades system design robustness, increases parachute loads and 
generally diminishes the probability of overall mission success. Associated with this is 
the need to incorporate realistic growth margins into the vehicle’s design to mass budget. 
In addition, this can be mitigated in part by defining a robust set of structural loads 
requirements as early as possible in the project design cycle. 
  A rapid prototyping activity like MLAS can be accomplished using virtual meeting 
technologies supplemented by periodic Co-Locations of the entire team and by 
leveraging modern online concurrent data sharing and configuration management 
capabilities.  
4.2 Constellation System Preliminary Design Review (PDR) Assessment 
The Constellation Chief Engineer requested the NESC to participate in the CxP Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR) process as the Independent Review Team (IRT). The NASA Technical 
Fellow for GN&C, along with members of his GN&C TDT, served on this IRT. The purpose of 
the IRT was to ensure technical issues were not overlooked due to familiarity with the PDR 
products. The IRT was asked to identify technical issues in three categories. The first category 
was an issue or resolution to an issue that was incomplete or not fully addressed. The second 
category was an issue that was not addressed. The third category was an issue that the IRT 
disagreed with its resolution or had a contrary opinion. 
The CxP PDR process, which culminated in April 2010, had the following several objectives:   
 Demonstrate the End-to-End (E2E) understanding of the Initial Operational Capability 
Mission and where the design is driven by the Lunar Mission 
 Demonstrate that the completed analysis and tests provide the results necessary to close 
the architecture to accomplish the Design Reference Missions 
 Demonstrate the architecture performance is capable of accomplishing the E2E mission 
with acceptable risk 
 Identify key architecture risks and associated mitigation status 
 Baseline Initial Capability Interface Requirements Documents and draft Spacecraft 
Interface Control Documents  
 Documented Program Test & Verification Strategy and draft System Integration Plans 
released 
 Define the Forward Work plan necessary for a successful CxP Critical Design Review  
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The IRT members first participated in a series of discipline-specific Face-to-Face Integration 
Reviews, each led by the respective phase lead engineer. This was an excellent approach to 
somewhat informally ‘break the ice’ technically in each of the mission phases (e.g., ascent, on-
orbit, entry descent and landing, etc.) prior to the actual formal CxP PDR milestone. These 
mission phase reviews were held near the Johnson Space Center (JSC), Houston, Texas, over the 
period from November 2009 through December 2009. In addition, the IRT participated in the 
PDR kickoff meeting held the week of January 12, 2010 and the PDR Pre-Board and PDR Board 
meetings held the week of March 1, 2010. The IRT provided 41 review item discrepancies (RID) 
and five comments in the RID system.  
Overall, the GN&C Technical Fellow and the participating members of the GN&C TDT believed 
the CxP PDR process was a good high-level review of the Program maturity and identified the 
issues, work completed, work to be performed, etc. The face-to-face meetings created an 
environment of open communication among all participants. The face-to-face teams were very 
receptive to the IRT’s comments and met separately with the IRT to alleviate concerns and 
issues. The RID Review Teams (RRT) attempted to understand the issues by speaking directly 
with the RID initiators rather than just reviewing the RIDs on paper. The RRTs tried to 
accommodate the initiators’ schedules and coordinated with them to be able to state their case 
directly. When impasses were reached, the reclama process was recommended to the initiators. 
The IRT agreed that the RRTs had worked with all the RID initiators to reach mutually agreeable 
resolutions to the issues that were raised and all RIDs that the IRT submitted were acceptably 
resolved. 
Clearly, the PDR process was a very successful forcing function to bring forth “gaps” and 
discrepancies. The identification of these occurred because of the open communications with the 
IRT and between all levels of the program and projects. However, it was apparent that not all the 
needed integration was occurring during normal program functions prior to the PDR process. It 
is understandable to have elements that lag behind others when everyone is concentrating on 
their top issue or latest problem. New issues were raised and clarifications were generated during 
the PDR process. For example, a RID was written to address the fact that, as presented, the Ares-
I Roll Control System (RoCS) propellant margins (at about 8%) were lower than the 20% margin 
typically desired at the time of the system PDR design milestone. 
The issues that were identified by the IRT were grouped into four broad themes and summarized 
in a NESC White Paper provided to CxP program managers and others. The items discussed in 
the NESC White Paper fell into all three categories of technical issues that the IRT was charged 
to identify. The first theme identified issues that were lacking the technical maturity required for 
a PDR. The areas of launch abort vehicle (LAV) performance in the transonic flight regime, 
updating of the integrated Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model, regression test planning, 
incorporation of human factors to support design trades and studies, and the mismatch of 
program and project maturity levels fell within this category. The recommendations included 
pursuing engineering solutions at this early stage of the design process and saving operational 
changes for later as the program matures and when design changes can be prohibitively 
expensive to implement.  
The second theme addressed uncertainty in models and simulations. The GN&C Technical 
Fellow and the GN&C TDT members felt the interpretation, quantification, and application of 
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model and data uncertainty were especially important areas to be addressed by both CxP 
managers and engineers. It is acceptable to have uncertainty in models and simulations, but 
quantifying the uncertainty and clearly communicating the model uncertainty to perform trades 
and to make informed decisions of risk needs to be emphasized.  
Mathematical models, and their associated data sets, are used to capture and represent the current 
state of knowledge of system physical behaviors in every element of the CxP architecture. These 
models and their supporting data are exercised to analyze and predict system sensitivities, 
performance against requirements, factor of safety/stability margins, risks and overall mission 
success.  
It is a recognized and accepted reality that these models and their data have limitations. Some 
models have insufficient experimental data to characterize precisely a probability distribution of 
critical model parameters and features. In other cases, there is only poor or limited understanding 
of the underlying physics phenomena or physical coupling between system elements or between 
sub-elements. Beyond our inability to completely understand the dynamics of a given problem 
there is also the reality that there will be both variability in the physical features/parameters of 
the as-built flight systems and additional variability in the operational environments encountered 
during manufacturing and assembly, ground operations, and mission operations. All of these 
aspects need to be accommodated and quantified in an uncertainty framework by the engineers 
using the models/data.  
Various methods and approaches have been used across CxP and its elements to characterize the 
uncertainty in these models and their supporting data. The NASA-STD-7009 for Models and 
Simulations was developed to help NASA programs/projects consistently address the challenges 
of documenting, analyzing, and communicating uncertainties, and several other modeling and 
simulation issues in the Agency. The NASA-STD-7009 also requires clear documentation and 
communication of model assumptions to decision makers. Reporting uncertainties in model 
inputs and outputs is required for critical analyses, and data/model uncertainty quantification are 
factors in the credibility assessment scale (CAS) review. The CAS review provides a common 
framework to evaluate models and simulations.  
However, there is not a consistent interpretation of uncertainty across the CxP architectural 
elements, and NASA-STD-7009 does not address inconsistency in model uncertainties across a 
set of analyses within a program. This is a concern since having a proper and consistent 
application of model/data uncertainties is fundamental to providing CxP decision makers with 
informed risk analysis information. Consistency is especially important where CxP decision 
makers are seeking to trade risk across architectural elements, across system elements, and 
across technical disciplines. Furthermore, flight system designs can be excessively over-
conservative if modeled uncertainties are significantly higher than the variations or unknowns of 
the physical system. Conversely, designs can be at risk of failure if modeled uncertainties are 
lower than the actual variations of the physical system. Input data uncertainties are included in 
the integrated loss of crew/loss of mission models, and the PRA results include reporting 
uncertainty ranges using 5th and 95th percentiles. 
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An example of the model uncertainty issue is a recent aerodynamic database model uncertainty 
distribution change that resulted in a reduction of the LAS attitude control motor (ACM) control 
authority in the transonic flight regime (M = 0.9–1.3, 35–47 sec mission elapsed time). This has 
driven the need for the CxP to investigate alternative means of improving performance of the 
LAV (e.g., adding ballast mass). In parallel, special wind tunnel tests are being pursued in an 
effort to lower the uncertainties in the aerodynamic database.  
There is some level of recognition that the application of model/data uncertainties needs to be 
improved within CxP and certain teams are actively working the issue. It is not clear however 
that the current practice of inconsistent interpretation and application of uncertainty across CxP 
has been elevated sufficiently high and captured as an integrated risk for the program. A 
common uncertainty framework for all CxP elements that is consistent with NASA-STD-7009 
would provide needed consistency and rigor in addressing the issues associated with model/data 
uncertainty. Per NASA-STD-7009, reporting uncertainties in model inputs and outputs is 
required for critical analyses and data/model uncertainty quantification, documentation, and 
communication are factors in the CAS review. 
With all the great work in models and simulation, a trap can occur where there is an overreliance 
on models and simulation. This can occur because the people who are doing the day-to-day 
problem solving are so caught up in working with the models and trying to reduce and define the 
uncertainty associated in the models that they fail to realize the solution they are obtaining can 
defy the basic laws of physics and engineering. Using engineering judgment to check the 
analytical results, engaging the critical end users in the process of quantifying uncertainties, and 
periodically re-evaluating assumptions and processes should occur to avoid this trap. 
The third theme addressed in the NESC White Paper deals with disconnects in the level of 
maturity between project elements and interfaces. The last theme discussed the process of 
identifying test needs. The IRT noticed a perception that some testing was not being pursued due 
to reasons of cost or schedule even though the test might significantly buy-down risk. The IRT 
recommended the development of a list of minimum required tests (i.e., an ‘incompressible’ test 
list). 
This particular experience reminded all the teams involved that an independent review can 
provide a fresh perspective not biased by long-term involvement with the project or program. 
The Face to Face Integration Reviews, led by the respective phase lead engineers, was a 
tremendously valuable first step in the overall CxP PDR process. For the CxP PDR, the IRT 
worked with the program and project personnel to identify new issues or issues that the program 
knew of, but did not have the right management visibility. More importantly, the IRT provided 
recommendations that should be pursued.  
4.3 Orion Ascent Abort One (AA-1) Loads Assessment 
In April 2009, the Systems Engineering Integration Team Lead in the Orion Test Flight Office 
requested that the NESC perform an independent assessment of AA-1 coupled loads analysis 
performed in support of AA-1 Load Cycle-1(LC-1).  
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Based on data from AA-1 LC-1, there were concerns regarding the high-load levels predicted 
during vehicle separation, twang, ascent, and maximum dynamic pressure (Max-Q). The NESC 
Team was tasked to perform an independent review of data and provide consultation on the 
analysis approach and associated assumptions, limitations, and uncertainties. The intent of the 
NESC review was to thoroughly scrub all aspects of LC-1 and then provide findings, 
observations and recommendations for any changes to be incorporated into the follow-on effort, 
LC-2. The NESC Team was not expected to provide an independent load analysis unless 
significant issues were identified. 
Figure 5 provides an illustrative comparison between the PA-1 flight test configuration and the 
AA-1 flight test configuration. The AA-1 LAV system includes the LAS, LAS fairing assembly, 
and CM. The AA-1 abort flight test will launch from the White Sands Missile Range. During the 
boost phase, the LAV will be connected to the abort test booster (ATB) through the separation 
ring (SR). The ATB will boost the LAV to an altitude of nearly 38,000 feet before separation of 
LAV from ATB/SR. The LAV abort motor (AM) and ACM will ignite and burn for less than 
five seconds. Then the LAS will separate from the CM, and the CM will descend via parachute 
to a soil landing.  
The critical loads for the LAV occur during the motor burn, parachute deployment, and landing. 
However, LC-1 covered only the motor burn phase, which included LAV separation from the 
ATB, ignition of the AM, and flight up to Max-Q.  
Several members of the GN&C TDT, together with members of the NESC Flight Mechanics 
TDT, supported this assessment by investigating and reporting on the technical features of the 
ATB boost phase flight control system (FCS) and other aspects of the AA-1 GN&C system 
design that influenced the vehicle loading during flight. In particular, the GN&C and Flight 
Mechanics TDT members concentrated on how the Monte Carlo analysis of the AA-1 boost 
phase and resulting separation conditions was performed.  
The team determined that LC-1 was adequate as a preliminary set of initial design loads for AA-
1 considering the number of uncertain or undefined parameters in structure, aerodynamics, event 
timing, etc. that existed at the time of the analysis. Given these qualifiers, it is not surprising that 
numerous areas were noted where improvements could be effected in LC-2. 
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Figure 5.  Comparison of PA-1 and AA-1 flight test configurations.  
Some of the items the NESC team found necessary to be corrected or implemented for LC-2 to 
produce a complete set of detailed design loads and thorough structural assessments included:   
 Develop a Project Technical Requirements Document that specifically defines AA-1 
hardware functional and design requirements, environmental requirements, interfaces 
with other hardware, etc. 
 Document the use of uncertainty factors or dispersions in the various LC-2 inputs to the 
analysis for concurrence by the responsible technical panels and the Orion Flight Test 
Office. 
 The thrust alignment/offset dispersions of the abort motor should be clearly defined (1 
degree was arbitrarily used). 
 The AM thrust offset dispersions to be used in the in LC-2 analysis should include such 
factors as temperature distortions, assembly tolerances, as alignments. 
 The boost phase Monte Carlo analysis should be used to define the required range of 
initial flight conditions at separation for the loads analysis in LC-2. 
 The full specified range of allowable center of gravity (CG) locations should be explored 
in LC-2. 
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 A sensitivity analysis should be performed to check the effect of extreme “corner of the 
box” CG mass properties on modal characteristics.  
 Propellant mass changes should be included in the LC-2 analysis as those changes affect 
both structural dynamics and CG shifts. 
4.4 Orion CM Boilerplate Water Drop Test Assessment Support 
In October 2009, the NESC initiated an assessment to perform the specific tests and analyses 
needed to provide the necessary verification to correlate LS-DYNA® simulation results with data 
collected during multiple water drop tests of a full-scale Orion CM boilerplate test article. The 
LS-DYNA® code is an advanced general-purpose multiphysics simulation software package 
developed by the Livermore Software Technology Corporation and used to design the Orion CM 
structure. The LS-DYNA® software package, which employs finite element analysis methods 
using explicit time integration, is especially well suited for the simulation of highly nonlinear 
transient dynamic events such as the impact dynamics of the CM structure when it lands in 
water. The nonlinear effects typically manifest themselves as changing boundary conditions, 
relatively large material deformations, and certain materials that do not exhibit ideally elastic 
behavior. Transient dynamic means analyzing high-speed, short-duration impact events where 
inertial forces are important. 
The fundamental structural design simulation tool for the Orion Project was LS-DYNA®, 
specifically developed to accommodate non-linear load paths as occur during water impacts. The 
NESC Assessment Team surveyed readily available LS-DYNA® literature on the use of the tool 
to model water impacts, and assessed that some of the techniques used are not deterministic but 
rely on manipulation by the analyst. Experimental data was required to anchor LS-DYNA® 
analyses of water impacts to mitigate the risk of the sort of impact damage seen during Apollo 
drop tests. A strong motivation for these NESC-sponsored tests is the very limited number of 
landing impact tests in the Orion Project plan planned to support the CM primary structure 
development and qualification. The Orion Project had concerns regarding the possibility that 
significant uncertainties would remain in the landing load environment, resulting in an unknown 
structural capability and an inability to achieve structural certification for flight. Since LS-
DYNA® is being used to establish the structural design of Orion, this program and other NASA 
programs are critically dependent on the validity of the answers generated by the tool. This 
independently performed and fast-paced series of drop tests, and the subsequent detailed 
evaluation of the data collected, are intended to support risk determination for the Orion Project 
and NASA, potentially influencing future CM testing plans and design options. This particular 
NESC assessment is contributing to the ultimate NASA goal of developing an integrated landing 
system design, with a mass-optimized space capsule structure, that will attenuate the impact 
loads transmitted to the crew to non-injurious levels. The key stakeholders for this assessment 
are the Orion Project team and the NASA Office of Chief Engineer.  
The NESC’s MLAS CM simulator (boilerplate) was identified as a rapidly available test article. 
This test article was instrumented in two phases, and tested via crane drops into water. 
Instrumentation included multiple inertial sensors, photogrammetric targets, pressure 
transducers, and strain gages. The first phase of drop tests were performed at the U.S. Army’s 
Aberdeen Proving Ground located in Maryland. The test article was hoisted via a crane to a pre-
determined level and then released to drop into the water (see Figure 6). In Phase I of this drop 
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test assessment, a total of eighteen (18) drops were conducted:  fourteen (14) were dropped from 
a height of ten feet and the remaining four (4) were “low-energy” drops released at a height of 
eight (8) feet.  
Members of the NESC GN&C TDT were requested to support both the generation of quick-look, 
in near realtime, inertial sensor data products as well as to perform the more detailed post-test 
processing and analysis of the water drop test data generated by multiple inertial sensors. The 
GN&C TDT members augmented the existing drop test by bringing the necessary skills and 
expertise to understand, convert, transform, format, process, and analyze data from the multiple 
gyroscopes and accelerometers mounted on the test article. The inertial sensors included four tri-
axial accelerometer packages, two packages mounted very near the CM test article’s CG and the 
other two mounted near the apex of the test article’s apex. There were also individually mounted 
analog devices single-axis micro electro-mechanical systems angular rate sensors (gyroscopes) 
as well as a Humphreys Crossbow® IMU. These inertial sensors were mounted on an aluminum 
structural crossbeam (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure  6.  Orion CM boilerplate water drop test at Aberdeen Proving Ground.  
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Figure 7.  Inertial sensor instrumentation mounted inside CM test article. 
Acceleration data was collected using analog sensors with a bandwidth of 1000 Hz, which was 
then sampled at a rate of 13,888 Hz, embedded in a telemetry stream, and recorded. A 
representative example of the raw data collected is the longitudinal axis (X-axis) acceleration vs. 
time data plot is presented in Figure 8. Quick-look analysis of the acceleration data collected 
revealed a noise floor at approximately –15 dB along with the undesired presence of several 
unwanted CM structural modes, in particular the structural modes of the aluminum crossbeam on 
which the sensors were mounted. The flexible body modes can be seen in Figure 8 over the range 
from 100 Hz – 1000 Hz with the peak flexible mode response occurring at 375 Hz at 
approximately +8 dB. A proper analysis of the acceleration data therefore required the 
attenuation of unwanted high-frequency structural “noise” while keeping the low-frequency test 
article rigid body information and the all-important relatively short duration (150 milli-second) 
splashdown transient. So, in addition to performing all the necessary data conversions, re-
formatting, and coordinate transformations of the various inertial data sets collected, the GN&C 
TDT contingent spent a great deal of time and effort studying and eventually selecting the type 
and order of digital filter that would sufficiently attenuate the high-frequency structural ringing 
effects from the desired rigid body motions.  
A third-order low pass filter (LPF) was initially selected to filter the raw accelerometer data 
collected. This LPF had two second-order poles each at 75 Hz and a single first-order pole at 85 
Hz. The second-order poles had a 0.7 damping ratio. The continuous form of the LPF (see 
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Equation 1 for this representation) was then converted to a digital LPF via the standard bi-linear 
transformation using a sampling period of 73.5 micro-seconds.  
  (1) 
Figure 9 shows the result of digitally low pass filtering the raw X-axis accelerometer data. 
Clearly, the flexible body effects are significantly reduced leaving a signal more closely 
representing the CM rigid body response. After much further technical deliberation with the LY-
DYNA® users a 6th-order LPF, applied in one direction only, was selected by the GN&C team to 
perform the necessary attenuation. Another significant effort concerned determination of the test 
article’s pre-drop initial conditions. Photogrammetric data was utilized to both define the initial 
conditions and the gyroscope drift and bias estimates. The GN&C TDT members provided 
sufficient processed inertial sensor test data to permit the comparison and verification of the LY-
DYNA® simulation results. Phase II water drop test with improved inertial instrumentation are 
planned for early FY2011.  
  
Figure 8.  Representative raw X-axis CG#1 accelerometer data from CM water drop test.  
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Figure 9.  Low pass filtered X-axis CG#1 accelerometer data from CM water drop test.  
4.5 Assessment of Orion Slosh Impact on Ares-I FCS Stability 
The deleterious effects of propellant sloshing on launch vehicle stability have been long 
recognized by FCS designers. Slosh dynamics were carefully considered on both the Apollo 
Saturn-V launch vehicle and the Space Shuttle launch vehicle. The term “sloshing” is used here 
to describe the phenomenon of the free surface oscillations of the fluid (either fuel or oxidizer) in 
a partially filled tank.  
In December 2009 the NESC GN&C TDT was asked to assess the impacts of the Orion Service 
Module (SM) slosh dynamics on the Ares-I crew launch vehicle FCS stability and performance. 
Figure 10 depicts the Ares-I launch vehicle shortly after liftoff from Kennedy Space Center. The 
NESC assessment team sought resolutions to two fundamental issues:  1) assess conservatism in 
Marshall Space Flight Center’s (MSFC) Ares-I GN&C impact analysis of Orion SM bare tank 
slosh dynamics; and 2) Determine if the MSFC GN&C team can design an Ares-I FCS, which 
accommodates the 0.03% Orion SM bare tank slosh mode damping and satisfies all stability 
robustness and performance requirements. Given the short time duration of this assessment, the 
NESC did not perform any independent GN&C modeling, simulation, or analysis. Rather the 
focus was placed on understanding the details of the Ares-I GN&C modeling, simulation and 
analyses performed by the MSFC flight control engineers.  
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Stabilizing the Orion SM slosh mode dynamics on top of the Ares-I flexible-body and LOX/LH2 
slosh dynamics poses a challenging flight-control design problem for MSFC. Extremely low 
values of Orion slosh damping emerged as early as June 2009 as a key driver in the Ares-I 
GN&C design. The NESC first became fully aware of the sensitivities of the Ares-I FCS design 
to the extremely lightly damped Orion slosh dynamics in November 2009. This occurred at the 
CxP Ascent/Ascent Aborts Integrated Phase Review held at JSC as a precursor to the CxP 
System-level PDR board. This was true cross-project system engineering and integration issue 
between Orion and Ares. At that time, as a minimum, it was recommended that a new CxP 
Program-level risk be created and tracked within the CxP Integrated Risk Management 
Assessment (IRMA) framework to provide visibility of the Orion/Ares slosh problem. Several 
elements of risk were to be included in this new IRMA risk item, including: 
 Risk to Ares GN&C resources and schedule, 
 Lack of flexibility to accommodate future Ares vehicle challenges, changes, and 
opportunities, 
 Loss of Ares capability to accommodate failures, 
 Risk for meeting program stability and margin requirements, 
 Risk for increased structural loads, 
 Loss of significant robustness and hence safety, and 
 Risk to Ares’ ability to certify GN&C for flight readiness. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Ares-I launch vehicle shortly after liftoff. 
 22 
The challenge for the Ares-I FCS designer is to meet simultaneously the stability margin 
requirements cited above and the linear step response requirements. There are other high-level 
flight performance requirements that also must be satisfied but these were the one of most 
interest to the NESC assessment team. Lastly, it should be noted that no minimum fluid slosh 
damping requirements were ever placed, by the Ares-I Project, on the Orion Project’s SM fuel 
and oxidizers fluid/tank system.  
The Ares GN&C 7 design cycle analysis, completed by MSFC flight control engineers in June 
2009, had indicated Ares-I FCS sensitivities to Orion SM fuel and oxidizer slosh dynamics. The 
problem was attributed to two major factors:  1) the Orion’s SM fuel and oxidizer tanks are 
partially filled, resulting in a significant sloshing mass; and 2) the Orion SM tanks have very 
smooth bare walls. Slosh mode damping values, determined using the industry-standard NASA 
SP-106 handbook (Reference 2) methodology were computed to be an order of magnitude below 
NASA heritage. The NESC team performed a comparison of the Orion SM slosh damping values 
with the Ares-I launch vehicle slosh damping values and legacy slosh damping values from the 
Space Shuttle Program and the Apollo Saturn launch vehicle. The empirically computed 1-g 
minimum slosh mode damping value for the Orion nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) oxidizer tank was  
0.0003 or 0.03%. Likewise, the empirically computed 1-g minimum slosh mode damping value 
for the Orion monomethylhydrazine (MMH) fuel tank was 0.0006 or 0.06%. The NESC 
assessment team verified these empirical 1-g calculations of damping values. 
The MSFC Ares-I flight control team was unable to develop a design that would meet stability 
robustness requirements using the 0.03% (NTO) and 0.06% (MMH) damping values. The Ares-I 
flight control team was given action to quantify impacts to their FCS design due to the extremely 
low Orion SM tank damping values. Subsequently multiple Ares-I FCS redesigns were 
performed to accommodate partially filled, low-damped Orion SM tanks. In order to achieve the 
required stability margins for both first stage and upper stage flight in the GN&C 7 Ares-I design 
cycle the Orion SM tank slosh damping values were arbitrarily increased from the empirically 
calculated smooth wall 0.03 – 0.06% damping values to a damping value of 0.5%. At the time 
the NESC assessment was initiated these Ares-I analyses were only in a preliminary state and it 
was recognized that another full Ares-I GN&C design cycle (i.e., the GN&C 8 cycle) would be 
required to fully quantify the flight control issues and impacts. In particular it was noted that the 
impacts on the slosh dynamics due to many routine transient events such as liftoff “twang”, stage 
separation, LAS jettison, SM panel deployment, the ullage settling motor firings, and potential 
interactions with the non-linear reaction control system roll axis controller, had not yet been 
studied.  
As depicted in Figure 11, the FCS architecture for the Ares-I consists of a classical proportional-
integral-derivative (PID) controller design with loop shaping compensation (i.e., digital filters) to 
provide phase and gain stabilization of the flexible body modes and/or fluid slosh modes. The 
“proportional” term determines the controller response to the currently sensed error, the 
“integral” term determines the response based on the sum of recent errors, and the “derivative” 
term determines the reaction based on the rate at which the error has been changing. The 
weighted sum of these three different control actions is used to generate the thrust vector control 
(TVC) command for the next control cycle. The PID controller gains and the filter parameters 
are all gain scheduled which is consistent with industry practice.  
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The pitch and yaw axes TVC system controllers share this common system architecture. The 
Ares-I roll axis controller takes a different form and is a non-linear phase-plane RoCS thruster-
based controller quite different from the TVC pitch and yaw controllers. The roll controller has 
been developed from legacy Shuttle and International Space Station ISS phase-plane controller 
designs.  
Table 1 summarizes the Ares-I FCS stability gain and phase margin requirements for the low-
frequency rigid body/aero/slosh condition as well as for the cases where the flexible body modes 
of the launch vehicle are either gain or phase stabilized. Traditionally, the gain and phase 
margins are used as control system stability robustness metrics and they represent a tolerance to 
both plant disturbances and environment uncertainties. The requirements shown in Table 1 are 
consistent with industry practice. Note that under fully dispersed conditions the minimum rigid 
body/aero/slosh gain and phase margin requirements are suitably lowered to 3 dB and 20 
degrees, respectfully, but are not dropped to zero as done on some projects. The establishment of 
diminished but finite dispersed gain and phase margins in this manner is especially prudent given 
the developmental nature of the Ares-I launch vehicle. These Ares-I stability margin 
requirements listed in Table 1 are very similar to, and one can most likely trace their origin to, 
the stability gain and phase margin requirements levied on the Space Shuttle launch vehicle 
which are shown in Table 2. 
 
Figure 11.  High-level Ares-I FCS architecture. 
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Table 1. Ares-I FCS stability margin requirements. 
 
 
Table 2. Space Shuttle launch vehicle FCS stability margin requirements. 
Parameter 
Condition 
Nominal Dispersed 
Rigid Body GM (dB) 6 3 
Rigid Body PM (deg) 30 20 
Slosh Mode PM (deg) 25 15 
Slosh Mode GM (dB) 6 3 
Flexible Body Mode Attenuation (dB) 10 6  
 
The Ares-I gain and phase margin definitions for rigid body, slosh, and flex body dynamics are 
notionally illustrated in Figure 12 (first-stage example) and Figure 13 (upper-stage example). 
The red regions reflect ±6 dB gain and ±30-degree phase from the critical stability point. Lower 
frequency gain margins (rigid/aerodynamics and slosh) are defined at the 180-degree phase 
crossover, while required high-frequency flex gain attenuation is defined as peak gain, measured 
from the 0 dB axis. For Ares-I phase stabilized flexible modes, both lead and lag phase margins 
are defined. The general design philosophy for Ares-I first-stage flight is to robustly phase 
stabilize the first flexible mode, and robustly gain stabilize the second and all higher flexible 
modes. The design approach for upper-stage flight control is to have all vehicle flexible modes 
be gain stabilized.  
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Figure 12.  Notional depiction of Ares-I FCS gain and phase margins (first-stage example). 
 
Figure 13.  Notional depiction of Ares-I FCS gain and phase margins (upper-stage example). 
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Figure 14 depicts, for a specific ISS mission case, the control system, flexible body, and slosh 
mode frequencies as a function of time, with uncertainty included, over the period from launch to 
600 seconds after launch. This figure graphically illustrates the challenges of designing a control 
system for first-stage powered flight. The launch vehicle flexible body dynamics must be 
stabilized by the FCS throughout flight. A large percentage of the vehicle mass is composed of 
propellant, which is consumed during the boost phase. This loss of mass significantly changes 
the structural dynamics as propellant is depleted. For most fill levels, slosh frequency scales 
proportionally with vehicle acceleration and damping scales inversely. The Ares-I first-stage 
maximum acceleration is about 3 g’s, which results in increased slosh frequencies and decreased 
damping. Stability issues can occur with this shift in Orion slosh frequency under the influence 
of the launch vehicle 3-g acceleration. 
The potential for destabilizing Ares-I flexible body mode dynamic coupling and interaction with 
Orion NTO and MMH slosh modes is apparent from an examination of Figure 14. The Ares-I 
full-stack structure first flexible mode frequency is very near the same frequency as the Orion 
SM slosh modes, which can cause decreased margins and difficulty in filter design. The MSFC 
team pointed out that the NASA SP-8031 “Slosh Suppression” guidelines document (Reference 
3) recommends separation between the flexible body and fluid slosh mode frequencies to 
minimize flex body/slosh dynamic interaction.  
During this assessment, questions were raised by the GN&C TDT members regarding the 
implementation details of MSFC’s linear spring-mass slosh mechanical model used in their 
Marshall Aerospace VEhicle Representation In “C” (MAVERIC) 6-degree of freedom (DOF) 
simulation. There was discussion comparing linear versus non-linear slosh modeling. This topic 
arose after the NESC team requested to see output data on the slosh amplitudes seen in MSFC 
simulations. The need for and the potential benefits of a non-linear slosh model were discussed 
Plans for an Ares-I GN&C mini-design cycle where the stability margin and performance 
sensitivities will be evaluated over a range of Orion damping values from 0.1% to 0.5% were 
also discussed. The stated objective was to determine if there is a “knee” in the sensitivity trend 
curve at a damping value less than 0.5%.  
Over the period from mid-December 2009 to early February 2010 the NASA Technical Fellow 
for GN&C, along with several members of his GN&C TDT, met multiple times with the MSFC 
Ares-I GN&C team. The following items were reviewed by the NESC assessment team:   
 Ares-I GN&C architecture,  
 Ares-I GN&C stability and flight performance requirements,   
 Legacy GN&C references from Saturn,  
 Analysis methodology and tools, 
 Analytic assumptions,   
 Uncertainty assumptions,  
 Modeling techniques,   
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 The technical interaction/model data transfer between the Orion team and Ares-I GN&C 
team, and  
 Analysis results, both frequency domain and time domain. 
The MSFC Ares-I GN&C Team has used technically sound and appropriate (traditional industry 
standard type) analytical methods to assess the impact of the very lightly damped (0.03%) Orion 
slosh mode. The depth of the MSFC team’s technical rigor, physical understanding, and problem 
insights was clearly apparent.  
 
Figure 14.  Ares-I control, flexible body, and slosh mode frequencies vs. time. 
Specifically regarding the level of conservatism in the MSFC slosh analyses, the NESC 
assessment team concluded the following: 
 The Orion estimates of propellant slosh damping ratios in the Orion SM tanks of 0.03% 
(NTO) to 0.06% (MMH) are generally consistent with calculations using industry 
standard and historical techniques, and do not appear to be overly conservative.  
 The Orion-provided pendulum mechanical models for Orion SM propellant slosh, 
provided to the Ares-I personnel, and the integration and use of those models in the Ares-
I MAVERIC 6-DOF simulation and linear analysis tools are generally consistent with 
industry standard and historical techniques, and do not appear to be overly conservative. 
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However, it was also observed that the MAVERIC 6-DOF simulation tool used by the Ares-I 
flight control engineers at MSFC does not clearly flag cases in which the displacement of the 
point mass used in the Orion SM tank slosh spring-mass mechanical model exceeds the 
maximum displacement consistent with the linear fluid slosh fundamental mode on which they 
are based. The NESC team felt strongly that this transition point, between the linear slosh regime 
and the non-linear slosh regime, must be clearly identified.  
For linear fluid slosh at the fundamental slosh mode to occur, there is a generally accepted rule 
of thumb that the maximum height of the fluid wave at the outer wall of the tank should not 
exceed approximately 10% of the radius of the tank. For greater fluid wave heights, the 
fundamental anti-symmetric slosh wave tends to break apart into more complex wave shapes 
because of splashing and breaking of the waves, reducing the amount of mass that continues to 
slosh at the fundamental mode natural frequency. Using the linear mechanical slosh model 
beyond this linear range could result in overly pessimistic predictions of the forces imparted on 
the tank walls by the propellant slosh. 
The Southwest Research Institute slosh tool computes an estimate of the ratio of the maximum 
fluid wave height at the tank outer wall to the maximum amplitude of the pendulum mechanical 
model. For the Orion propellant tanks at the nominal lunar and ISS mission fill levels, the slosh 
tool predicts that ratio to be approximately 1.5. That is, the maximum fluid wave height at the 
tank outer wall is approximately 50% larger than the maximum amplitude of the pendulum 
mechanical model. Since the Orion propellant tanks are 50 inches in diameter, 10% of their 
radius is equivalent to a maximum wave height at the tank outer wall of approximately 2.5 
inches, which when divided by the ratio of wave height to pendulum displacement, yields a 
maximum pendulum amplitude (or the equivalent spring-mass displacement) of approximately 
1.7 inches. 
Until the recent design cycle, the Ares-I MAVERIC 6-DOF simulation did not have the 
capability to output the time history of the Orion SM tank slosh spring-mass displacement. Only 
the statistics for maximum amplitude could be examined. However, prior to the analyses of the 
current design cycle, the simulation was modified to output time history data of the slosh model 
spring-mass displacement. Initial evaluations of the nominal and typical Monte Carlo time 
history data does appear to suggest that the Orion SM tank slosh spring-mass displacements may 
be beyond the maximum allowable range for linear slosh models.  
Based on this initial finding, the NESC team recommended that MSFC review all MAVERIC 
tank slosh displacement data (nominal as well as Monte Carlo dispersed) to confirm operation 
within the linear range of the spring-mass mechanical models. 
As mentioned above, the MAVERIC 6-DOF simulation used for the current Ares-I GN&C 
design cycle was modified to provide output time history data for the displacement of the spring-
mass Orion tank slosh dynamics model. A comprehensive review of the tank slosh spring-mass 
displacement for nominal missions as well as Monte Carlo simulation ensembles should be 
performed to confirm whether the slosh model is operating within its linear range. Preliminary 
data provided for the slosh spring-mass displacement time histories has indicated that for low 
slosh damping, the Monte Carlo dispersed trajectory data does show significant intervals of 
operation of the Orion tank slosh dynamic model beyond its linear range.  
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Figure 15 shows a sample plot of the displacement of the spring-mass corresponding to the Orion 
NTO tank for a Monte Carlo run of mission TD71, using 0.1% tank slosh damping. In the figure, 
the red line indicates the nominal mission spring-mass displacement, while the blue lines indicate 
the 2000 Monte Carlo runs. The black horizontal line shows the approximate limit of 0.14 feet 
(or 1.7 inches) for operation of the slosh model in its linear range. Clearly, there are significant 
time intervals where the tank slosh displacement exceeds the maximum limit for linear operation 
for the dispersed cases, although the nominal simulation run shows operation well within the 
linear range. 
The GN&C TDT members of the assessment team recommended that a comprehensive review of 
existing MAVERIC simulation data should be reviewed to determine the extent at which the 
current Orion tank slosh spring-mass mechanical models may be operating outside of their linear 
range. Following such an analysis, the Ares-I personnel may consider developing and using non-
linear tank slosh dynamic models. Recent technical discussions of the NESC assessment team 
with representatives from United Launch Alliance have suggested that such non-linear tank slosh 
models have been developed for use with large tank slosh mechanical model displacements and 
have been used in their tank slosh analyses, which may be of use to the Ares-I analysis of Orion 
tank slosh.  
Therefore, it was also recommended that MSFC consider the development and use of non-linear 
tank slosh mechanical models for the Orion SM propellant tank slosh. The NESC team observed 
that the displacement of the Orion tank slosh spring-mass mechanical models may be operating 
beyond the linear range at which they are considered to be valid mechanical representations of 
Orion tank slosh dynamics. It was recommended that the Ares-I personnel consider 
implementing non-linear tank slosh mechanical models in their MAVERIC 6-DOF simulation 
and linear analysis tools to provide higher confidence in their predictions of the effects of Orion 
SM tank slosh on the Ares-I vehicle controllability.  
 
Figure 15.  Orion upstream NTO tank slosh displacement (0.1% damping; TD71 mission). 
10% tank radius / 1.5 
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The primary recommendation of the NESC team was for CxP to modify Orion propellant tanks 
to increase damping. 
Any concerns raised about the “degree of confidence” in the Ares-I / Orion SM tank slosh 
dynamics models used for the analysis of the effects of Orion tank slosh on Ares-I controllability 
are largely related to uncertainties caused by the very low damping ratios predicted for the Orion 
SM tank slosh. For example, operating those slosh mechanical models within their linear range 
and the effects of lateral tank excitation near the fluid slosh fundamental mode natural frequency 
are largely affected by the low damping, and increasing that damping by an order of magnitude 
or more, would help improve the confidence in the applicability of those slosh mechanical 
models.  
4.6 Kepler Recurring Anomalies  
In January 2010, the NESC was requested to support an investigation into recurring anomalies 
onboard the Kepler spacecraft. This spacecraft, launched on March 7, 2009, is depicted in Figure 
16. The Kepler Mission (NASA Discovery mission #10) is specifically designed to survey our 
region of the Milky Way Galaxy to discover hundreds of Earth-size and smaller planets in or 
near the habitable zone and determine how many of the billions of stars in our galaxy have such 
planets. Results from this mission will allow us to place our solar system within the continuum 
of planetary systems in the Galaxy. 
At the time of this request, the spacecraft had been in routine science operations returning high-
quality science data for over nine months since operations began on May 12, 2009. The 
spacecraft had experienced a number of anomalies that have interrupted science data collection, 
but was operating well within its margins throughout the Science Operations mission phases and 
was still meeting its science requirements. However, while Kepler had not experienced any 
spacecraft emergencies it had experienced a number of star-tracker related anomalies.  
 
Figure 16.  Kepler spacecraft and photometer. 
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The GN&C Technical Fellow and members of the GN&C TDT supported this NESC assessment 
of the Kepler anomalies. The NESC team reviewed the spacecraft’s general operations 
philosophy, current analysis of the anomalies, the timelines and fish-bones generated, the 
mitigations undertaken or under consideration, and the effects of the mitigations. The team also 
studied the mission’s anomaly response and resolution process as well as the available anomaly 
statistics. The NESC team also investigated the planned paths to get to the root-cause of the 
anomalies, the remaining work to bring anomalies to closure and any residual risks.  
The scientists using the Kepler data prefer long and stable data segments to perform their search 
for planetary transits. The mission design therefore requires only simple periodic operational 
interactions with the Kepler spacecraft. There are three key operational activities performed by 
the Kepler Flight Operations Team (FOT):  1) semi-weekly health and safety contacts; 2) 
monthly science data downloads via contact with NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN); and 3) 
quarterly roll maneuvers. The Kepler photometer instrument stares at the same field for the entire 
mission. The science target location is redefined on the photometer’s charge coupled devices 
after each quarterly roll. There are also small sets of science target changes for Guest Observers 
and for higher-resolution observations. 
Kepler is a data-driven mission, so data completeness is key to mission success. There are two 
key data completeness requirements to be satisfied. The first is the 92% requirement for Onboard 
Data Completeness. This requirement essentially has to do with how much of total operational 
time is the spacecraft actually collecting science data. It is influenced by numerous factors, 
including the time spent off-pointing to downlink science data, the time needed to perform the 
quarterly rolls, the time needed to unload excess reaction wheel momentum and the time the 
vehicle spends in safe mode events or other anomalies. The second major requirement is the 
Flight-to-Ground Data Completeness metric of 99%, which is directly linked to how much of the 
science data collected onboard actually reaches the mission’s data archive. The quality of the 
DSN space-to-ground link performance and the ability for data retransmission primarily impacts 
this requirement.  
Since it so fundamentally drives the attainment of the Onboard Data Completeness requirement, 
the NESC team first considered the Kepler FOT team’s anomaly response philosophy. The 
response to a vehicle anomaly is guided by a realistic and pragmatic three-tiered priority 
philosophy. The first priority is to ensure vehicle safety by preserving functionality, including 
on-board fault protection. The second priority is to resume science data collection while the 
anomaly investigation proceeds in parallel. The third priority is to mitigate against further 
occurrences of the anomaly in order to reduce the threat of future loss of science or spacecraft 
functionality. The Kepler engineers budget for the potential loss of up to twelve days of science 
data collection per year from safing events.  
Since operations began on May 12, 2009, as of January 2010, the Kepler spacecraft has entered 
safe mode three times (June 15th , July 2nd , and November 18th 2009) and the loss of the 
finepoint attitude control capability needed for science data collection has also occurred three 
times (August 13th , September 14th , and October 9th 2009). Entry into safe mode is a pre-
planned self-protective measure that the spacecraft takes when something unexpected occurs 
onboard. During safe mode, the spacecraft points the solar panels directly at the sun and begins 
to slowly rotate about a sun-aligned axis. The spacecraft automatically powers off the 
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photometer and one redundant subsystem as a safety precaution. Shortly following the 
November 18th safe-mode entry the FOT engineers immediately began telemetry analysis to 
determine spacecraft subsystem health and root-cause determination of what triggered the safe 
mode. This was the third safe mode Kepler had experienced since operations began in May 2009 
and it was classed as a Criticality 1 anomaly. Criticality 1 anomalies are those that represent an 
unacceptable risk or have high impact to achieving the Kepler baseline mission objectives. 
Onboard detection of a Criticality 1 anomaly will automatically force the spacecraft into safe 
mode.  
This particular safe mode occurred when the team was preparing to download another month of 
scientific data from Kepler. The scientific data was not at risk and was subsequently downloaded 
successfully via the DSN communications link the day after the safe-mode event. Engineers 
verified nominal performance of all of Kepler’s systems and successfully recovered the vehicle 
from safe mode. Science data collection was resumed by the evening of November 20. The safe-
hold entry was traced to an undesired interaction between the spacecraft’s flight software and its 
star tracker. The root cause is understood. Near-term mitigation of the problem is in place and a 
long-term mitigation is to be implemented. The anomaly investigation has revealed three star-
tracker related issues. The first is that the star trackers unexpectedly drop stars and/or declare 
stars invalid, leading to a lost-in-space (LIS) condition. The second is that the star tracker 
remains in LIS mode for unexpectedly long time. The third and last issue is that star tracker 
directed search commands occasionally fail.  
The NESC team is still in the process of reviewing the details of the anomaly investigations and 
the associate mitigation or resolution plans. The Kepler management team, the NASA 
engineering team, and the contractor engineering team are using sound risk management 
principles to guide the process for the resolution of each anomaly and to set appropriate 
priorities.  
5.0 Conclusions 
This paper has described how the NESC was formed as an independent organization dedicated to 
promoting safety through engineering excellence. A resource for the Agency, it is a valuable 
problem-solving asset for the high-risk programs that NASA has always undertaken. NESC 
brings together some of NASA’s best engineers with experts from industry, academia, and other 
government agencies to address our highest risk, most complex issues. NESC strives to cultivate 
a safety-focused culture focused on engineering and technical excellence, while fostering an 
open environment and attacking the Agency’s technical challenges with unequalled tenacity. 
The NESC is more than a problem-solving organization however. It is also an organization that 
works to improve the competence of our entire engineering workforce through the opportunity to 
work on challenging problems, through exposure to other people, tools, techniques and facilities 
from across the Agency, through discipline advancing proactive work, and through its 
promulgation of lessons learned via technical reports and the NESC Academy courses. 
The backbone of the NESC is the ready group of engineering experts organized into 15 
discipline areas TDTs. In this paper, the purpose of the NESC GN&C TDT has been highlighted 
and a number of their experiences described. The members of the GN&C TDT have contributed 
to solving problems in many of NASA’s human spaceflight and robotic spaceflight programs and 
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projects. Their collective efforts have ranged from the assessment of alternative LASs, on-orbit 
robotic spacecraft anomalies, propellant sloshing impacts on launch vehicle flight stability and 
control, loads and dynamics support, and specialized ground testing of future flight systems.  
The NESC, because of its demonstrated ability to focus the technical talent from across all 
NASA Centers to bear on diverse high-priority problems, has become a valuable resource to 
senior Agency decision makers. The NESC has established itself as a reliable, credible and 
respected organization within the Agency and it is an outstanding example of Engineering 
Excellence in practice. This is evidenced by the increase in requests, from all levels of the 
Agency, for NESC support in resolving problems, reviewing activities, and conducting special 
studies. The NESC, employing the advantages of distributed “virtual organization” architecture, 
has shown its ability to concentrate appropriate levels of technical expertise efficiently when and 
where needed to independently address some of NASA’s most challenging and most visible 
problems. Some consider the NESC to be one of the Agency’s most positive post-Columbia 
success stories. 
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